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Comment:

Between Women/Between Men: The
Significance for Lesbianism of Historical
Understandings of Same-(Male)Sex
Sexual Activities
Mary Coombs*

The two primary articles in this Symposium each contribute
significantly to the project of providing a history for same-sex sexual
activities and desires. That project is politically and intellectually
valuable, both in its own right and as a means toward understanding
contemporary "homosexuality."'
It also has potential legal

* Professor, University of Miami School of Law. B.A., M.A., J.D., University of Michigan.
I want to thank Mary Anne Case, Anne Goldstein, Patrick Gudridge, Ruthann Robson, and
James Wilets for their comments on prior drafts, and especially Frank Valdes, who persuaded
both the Journal and me to turn our frequent and stimulating conversations about these issues
into a published comment. I also want to thank my research assistant, Ms. Anna Selden, for her
unflagging help and good cheer.
1. 1 do not use the word "homosexuality" in describing same-sex erotic attachments in other
cultures. The meaning of that term is complex and contested even within contemporary culture.
See, e.g., Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the
Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073, 1079-80 (1988). Applying it
trans-historically compounds these problems. Instead, I refer to the congeries of erotic
attractions and practices between men or between women as "lovemaking." (Thanks to Anne
Goldstein for suggesting the use of this capacious and non-medicalized term.) The degree of
similarity between practices in other cultural contexts and contemporary Western gay or lesbian
practices, or between responses of dominant cultures to such practices, is a contested question,
whose answer is unnecessary for this Comment. By avoiding the terms "gay" and "lesbian" for
the practices of other times and places, I mean only to leave the answer open. Cf EVA
CANTARELLA, BISEXUALITY IN THE ANCIENT WORLD vii (1992) (noting "how imprecise and
misleading it is to speak of 'homosexuality' with reference to the ancient world").
Morris and Valdes help remind us that contemporary homosexualities (or, more precisely, gay
male and lesbian relationships) are also products of a particular, historically situated culture.
As scholars, we can study the past and the present. We do not, and cannot, know how desire
might be constructed, or what the significance of the sex or gender of one's erotic partner might
be, in a possible future world without patriarchy. I applaud Valdes' attempt to rescue desire
from procreation and other instrumental uses, wherever that might lead. Francisco Valdes,
Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy:Tracingthe Conflation of Sex, Gender, and Sexual Orientationto
its Origins, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 161, 208-09 (1996).
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implications. The term "law office history" is a pejorative, not
because history is irrelevant to law, but because the history put to use
for legal causes is so often bad history. By contrast, both these
articles appear to be good history, theoretically sophisticated and wellgrounded in the relevant source materials. They are also, however,
limited history, for each focuses overwhelmingly on the history of
lovemaking between men.
In the first part of this Comment, I want to consider the significance
of that androcentrism-of the articles and of the historical records
upon which they build-for the legal implications each author seeks
to draw from the history he has uncovered. Can this history be used
on behalf of the legal interests of lesbians?2 The second part of the
Comment focuses more directly on the relative absence of a rich
anthropological and historical record of female lovemaking in these
cultures. What does that historical gap mean for lesbians and our
interests? What can one infer about these cultures from the relative
thinness of the record? If, as I suggest, erotic attachments between
men and erotic attachments between women were not historically
viewed as essentially similar practices, what would that mean for
contemporary understandings of homosexuality, both by the law and
within gay and lesbian communities? These latter questions are
enormously important; I hope here at most to inscribe them in our
consciousness as a topic for continued discourse.
Preliminarily, I briefly summarize the theses of Morris and Valdes
insofar as they relate to the topic of this Comment. Configuring the
Bo(u)nds of Marriage:The Implicationsof HawaiianCulture & Values
for the Debate About Homogamy,3 by Robert Morris, consists, in
part, of an evocative and revealing study of the existence and cultural
significance of the aikane in traditional Hawaiian culture. Mining
Hawaiian language material as well as the commentaries of early
haole, he argues that the aikane is properly viewed as akin to a
spouse, rather than merely a same-sex friend or companion.' He
presents evidence of aikane relationships in Hawaiian legend and preand post-colonial Hawaiian history. Morris' historical work is
particularly valuable, since Hawaiian culture-unlike classical GrecoRoman culture-is relatively unexplored in English language sources.
Morris has, inter alia, produced a pathbreaking work that will allow

2. Without purporting to define or delimit those interests, I assume that one of them is
reducing the social and legal homophobia directed against us.
3. Robert J. Morris, Configuring the Bo(u)nds of Marriage: The Implications of Hawaiian
Culture & Values for the Debate About Homogamy, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 105 (1996).
4. See, e.g., id. at 136.
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future students of sexuality to include Hawaiian material in their
cross-cultural and historical studies. 5
Morris makes two related legal claims on the basis of his material.
First, he uses it to chip away at the foundations of Bowers v.
Hardwick.6 In footnote 6, the Bowers majority includes Hawai'i
among the jurisdictions outlawing sodomy in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was passed.7 Morris shows convincingly that this
assertion is rooted in a misreading of Hawaiian history. The point
seems well taken, and any attack on the legitimacy of Bowers is
always welcome.8 But the point is also of extraordinarily limited
relevance. Justice White was engaging in the worst form of law office
history, using history as a weapon rather than as a basis for analysis.
As previous scholars have demonstrated, the history in Bowers has
other and more pervasive flaws.9 Even positing that criticism of
Bowers will reduce its continuing legal and rhetorical force, deleting
Hawai'i from the list of jurisdictions outlawing sodomy in footnote 6
would scarcely have changed the outcome, nor would it significantly
affect anyone's view of the opinion's legitimacy.1" Moreover, since
Hawai'i was not part of, the United States in 1868, its contemporaneous position on sodomy or same-sex sexuality seems almost
irrelevant to the alleged issue of whether the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment would have perceived such practices as protected.
The more significant legal use Morris makes of his history is in the
context of Baehr v. Lewin." The Hawai'i Supreme Court in Baehr
found that a ban on same-sex marriage would be permissible only if
it served a compelling state interest, since such a ban was a form of
discrimination on the basis of sex, subject to strict scrutiny under the
Hawai'i State Constitution. 2 The court rejected, however, a due
process/privacy
claim that same-sex couples had a fundamental right
13
to marry.

5. Since I speak even less Hawaiian than my "little Latin and less Greek" (i.e., one word,
aloha, rather than a dozen or so), I assume the accuracy of Morris' historical facts about aikane
relationships and, in large measure, his interpretation of the significance of those facts in
Hawaiian culture. I could hardly do otherwise.
6. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
7. 478 U.S. at 192-93 n.6 (citing, inter alia, "Kingdom of Hawaii: Haw. Penal Code, ch. 13,
§11 (1869)").
8. Bowers looms over sexual orientation law like a brooding and malevolent omnipresence.
9. See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, ReasoningAbout Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers
v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721 (1993); Nan Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 531 (1992).

10. Morris seems to suggest that a more nuanced view of Hawaiian tradition and legal
history would instead place Hawai'i in a "footnote 6a" of jurisdictions recognizing same-sex
lovemaking. Even this reversal would not significantly change the opinion's legitimacy.
11. 852 P.2d 44 (1993).
12. Id. at 65.
13. Id. at 57.
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Morris provides a subtle and clever alternative basis for grounding
this right in what he calls the "Hawaiiana Clauses."14 The argument,
grossly oversimplified, is as follows: (1) The Hawaiiana Clauses
protect traditional Hawaiian usages from state interference, so long
as they are not "actually harmful"; 5 (2) Among those traditional
Hawaiian usages, according to the Hawaiian sources, were same-sex
relationships akin to marriage; 6 (3) Same-sex marriage, what Morris
calls "homogamy," is protected by the Hawaiian Constitution. In
effect, Morris' argument is that homogamy is constitutionally
protected because it is the contemporary analogy to practices found
in traditional Hawaiian culture. 7 Such a historically grounded basis
for the expected decision in Baehr on remand would strengthen the
legitimacy of the decision, though it also runs the risk of particularizing it in a way that would limit the decision's perceived
relevance for challenges in other states.
Francisco Valdes uses a different history to make a different
historical-legal argument. In Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy:Tracking
the Conflation of Sex, Gender, & Sexual Orientation to its Origins he
traces that conflation to its historical roots in the treatment of sex,
gender, and sexual orientation in classical Greece. 8 He briefly notes
the changes made by the Romans, by the early Christians and, finally,
the understandings of these concepts in contemporary Euro-America.
In each of these societies, there is a relatively clear cultural meaning
of gender: two patterns of behavior which might loosely be designated, in contemporary language, as "masculine" and "feminine."
Valdes, it should be noted, uses the term "gender" to refer both to
social gender-the congeries of public behaviors that most writers
mean by the term gender19-and
sexual gender-those sexual

14. Morris defines these as "a cluster of Hawaiian constitutional and statutory texts" that
mandate "deference to Hawaiian usages, custom, practices and language," at the time of first
Western contact. Morris, supra note 3, at 111.
15. Id. at 140.
16. Morris acknowledges that opposite-sex intimate relationships among commoners in
Hawai'i were only analogous to, not identical with, Euro-American conceptions of marriage.
See, e.g., id.at 129-30.
17. Morris also uses his knowledge of Hawaiian language, history, and culture to argue for
an alternative jurisprudence. See, e.g., id.at 139-40 (discussing different connotations of the
Hawaiian words used to translate "due process" and "equal protection of the laws"). This
melding of Hawaiian source material and American jurisprudence may be the most pathbreaking
aspect of the article; it is, however, outside the scope of this Comment.
18. The article is, as Valdes notes, a kind of prequel to his exploration of the current
understandings of those concepts in law and culture and the implications of unpacking the
conflation. See Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the
Conflation of "Sex," "Gender" and "Sexual Orientation"in Euro-American Law and Culture, 83
CAL. L. REV. 1 (1995).
19. Cf.Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 839 (1989)
(analyzing need for "a rule that avoids the traditional correlation between gender and sex, a rule
that is sex- but not gender-neutral" in context of discussion of legal rules regarding family and
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practices, including but not limited to the sex of one's partner, that in
a particular culture are considered appropriate for "masculine" or
"feminine" persons. The relationship between gender and sex and the
existence and meaning of a concept of sexual orientation, he
demonstrates, varies across these cultures.
Valdes refers to an alternative, historically grounded vision of the
possible relationship between sex, gender, and sexual orientation. He
argues that in Native American cultures there was no determinative
relationship between sex, i.e., biological sex as determined by external
genitalia, and gender.2" Each child was raised to be either masculine
or feminine, but the choice of the gender in which to raise the child
was only partially determined by the child's sex. Since a "masculine"
gendered person, who would take on the social and sexual roles of
that gender, might have either a penis or a vagina, the EuroAmerican concept of sexual orientation, in which sex, gender and the
sex/gender of one's sexual partner are co-determined, simply does not
apply. The berdache-the person whose sex and gender are unmatched-is a recognized cultural figure.21 He or she is not condemned as a "gender-traitor," as is the homosexual.22
In Greece and, to a much lesser extent, Rome, Valdes indicates that
the relationship between sex and gender, and thus the significance of
same-sex sexuality, was neither as open-textured as in Native
American cultures, nor as wholly conflated as in contemporary Euro-

workplace). But cf.SANDRA BEM, THE LENSES OF GENDER: TRANSFORMING THE DEBATE ON
SEXUAL INEQUALITY 82 (1993) ("[A]ny individual with cross-gender desires, whether sexual or
nonsexual, was seen as but another instance of... 'sexual inversion."').
20. This discussion, scattered in footnotes in this article, is more fully developed in Valdes,
supra note 18, at 211-42.
21. Some define the berdache as a person with the sex of a man but the gender of a woman,
or vice-versa. See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay
and Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantlethe Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage,"
79 VA. L. REV. 1535, 1538 (1993) (noting that most berdache unions "were in fact gendered...
with both partners... acting out their traditional gender roles"). Others have suggested that
the berdache is a third category that mixes genders. See, e.g., Charles Callender & Lee M.
Kochems, Men and Not-Men: Male Gender-Mixing Statuses and Homosexuality, in THE MANY
FACES OF HOMOSEXUALITY: ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR

165 (Evelyn Blackwood ed., 1986). Valdes' position is unclear. He refers to them as "socially
cross-gendered," but then says they constitute a "unique gender category" neither male nor
female. Valdes, supra note 1, at 188 n.97. This may reflect Valdes' conflation of social and
sexual aspects into a single concept of gender. See id. at 164.
22. Valdes, supra note 1, at 188 n.97. The berdache can have sexual relationships, if male,
with non-berdache men and, if female, with non-berdache women. Berdache do not appear to
form sexual bonds among themselves. This suggests that the berdacheconcept involves a fluidity
of persons between gender roles, but not a challenge to the gender roles themselves. Thanks
to Mary Anne Case for this insight.
Callender and Kochems provide other evidence that Native American cultures did not
conflate gender and sexual orientation. There were berdache who did not engage in homosexual
activity and there were non-berdache who did. What defined a man or woman as berdachewas
the gender inversion. Callender & Kochems, supra note 21, at 174. That is, Native American
cultures did not conflate "queers and sissies" or "dykes and tomboys."
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America. A male adult citizen was required to take on the gender of
masculinity. This included social roles designed and reserved for men.
It also included a particular sexuality, defined in terms not of the sex
of one's partner, but of one's role in the relationship. In classical
Greco-Roman culture, sexuality was divided into the two categories
of active and passive; being masculine meant being active.' A man
gendered as masculine played the active role, whatever the sex of the
passive partner. Correspondingly, the passive partner was gendered
as female, whatever his or her sex. In classical Greece, for instance,
the institution of pederasty structured a relationship in which an older
male citizen played the active role vis-a-vis young citizen boys, who
were expected, as part of their education, to adopt and perform the
passive role sexually in that relationship.24 Thus, gender was
relatively fluid,' for male citizens would pass through a stage of
sexual (though not social) female gender before becoming men. 26 In
Rome, too, male citizens' gendered sexuality was coded as active, and
could include sexual activity with a passive man without bringing the
active partner's masculinity into question. In contrast to classical
Greece, however, male lovemaking came to be seen less as a form of
intergenerational transmission of cultural values and more as the
23. See, e.g., Valdes, supra note 1, at 179-80. Active and passive might well be recharacterized as "penis-using" and "non-penis-using"--categories as sex-linked as the Supreme Court's
later division of "pregnant persons" and "non-pregnant persons." See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417
U.S. 484,497 n.20 (1974); cf. Mary Anne Case, DisaggregatingGenderfrom Sex and Orientation:
The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence,105 YALE L.J. 1, 14 (1995) ("For
much of Western history . . . women together with males who allowed themselves to be
penetrated orally or anally were opposed and seen as subordinate to 'active' penetrative
males.").
24. Although Valdes uses the term gender for both sexual and social roles, the youths were
effeminized only sexually. The social roles of young males and young females were radically
different. This effeminization, however, extended beyond the genital contact itself to the context
in which it arose. Thus, for example, the boy was expected to play the coy role later associated
with women in cross-gender romance. Valdes, supra note 1, at 189-90.
25. Gender was fluid in another context as well. A male slave would be gendered female
when serving as the passive partner of a male citizen, but he would be gendered male when he
took the active role with a female slave. Cf id. at 192-93 (noting contingency of sexual gender
in inter-class couplings on actor's place in dyadic social hierarchy).
26. Id. at 192. In Valdes' terminology, gender in Greece was deductive, i.e., determined by
sex, but not intransitive, since male citizens could change genders over their lifespan. By
contrast, it was not wholly deductive in Native American culture and is both deductive and
intransitive within dominant contemporary ideology.
Valdes is generally careful to note that this fluidity existed only for men in Greco-Roman
society, see, e.g., id. at 196, though even he is not immune to woman-obscuring statements, as
when he observes that the ancient Greeks "engaged in a form of pan-sexuality that transcended
• . . sexual orientation identities and categories," id. at 177 n.65. Some of his sources are
particularly prone to false conflation across gender lines. See, e.g., Maud W. Gleason, The
Semiotics of Gender Physiognomy and Self-Fashioning in the Second Century, in BEFORE
SEXUALITY: THE CONSTRUCTION OF EROTIC EXPERIENCE IN THE ANCIENT GREEK WORLD
389, 390 (David M. Halperin et al. eds., 1990). Gleason states that "[t]he essential idea [was]
that there exist masculine and feminine 'types' that do not necessarily correspond to the
anatomical sex of the person in question." This is true only insofar as the "person in question"
is anatomically male.
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expression of male licentiousness and domination. The Roman norm
was that the male partners for active male citizens ought to be noncitizens or slaves.27 Thus, in both cultures, playing the passive role
was roundly condemned for male citizens. 2 Valdes sees this as part
of the strict patrolling of gender lines, in furtherance of androcentrism
and patriarchy.
Finally, with the intermixture of Judeo-Christian concepts, all
homosexuality becomes proscribed. Sexuality itself is disapproved of,
except as necessary for procreation. 29 Same-sex sexual activity,
inherently for pleasure rather than procreation, is subject to social
and, ultimately, legal condemnation."
Valdes shows how, in this
process, gender and sex are conflated, as are sexuality and
procreation.
Valdes uses his historical and cross-cultural material for a quite
different legal-cultural purpose than does Morris. Valdes seeks to
give the conflation of sex, gender, and sexual orientation a history.
This history is relevant because both Bowers and the ban on gay
marriage reflect a belief that men and women are inherently and
necessarily different, and that part of that difference is manifested in
heterosexuality.
Valdes, however, highlights cultures, including
cultures to which Euro-American culture is linked geographically or
historically, in which it is accepted that being a man anatomically does
not necessarily require one to take on a particular social or sexual
gender. His aim is to explode the claim that the conflation and the

27.

CANTARELLA, supra note 1, at x; see also Valdes, supra note 1, at 200 n.136.

28. Condemnation, of course, does not mean that the practice did not occur. Indeed, it
suggests that such practices did occur and thus were in need of condemnation. See, e.g., DAVID
COHEN, LAW, SEXUALITY & SOCIETY 149 (1991); John J. Winkler, Laying Down the Law, in
BEFORE SEXUALITY, supra note 26, at 176.
29. See Valdes, supra note 1, at 200. But see JOHN BOswELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL
TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY 115 (1980) (suggesting that even Saint Paul did not demand
that sexuality be limited to procreation, but only "disapproved of any form of sexuality which
had as its end purely sexual pleasure," and "regarded licit sexuality as that contained within a

permanent and monogamous sexual relationship").
30. The sources of Judeo-Christian heterosexism are far too complex to summarize here.
What is relevant is the way in which this heterosexism built upon and interacted with the preexisting patriarchy of the Mediterranean societies in which Christianity developed.

31. This ideological shift also underlies the conflation of male and female lovemaking in
gender-neutral notions of sodomy and, later, homosexuality. Even in Greece and Rome, cultural
norms for women conflated sexuality and procreation, while men were also permitted or

encouraged to engage in non-procreational lovemaking. The advent of Christianity imposed on
men the same denial of sexuality for pleasure.
The very periodization that makes early Judeo-Christianity appear radically different from
pagan Greece and Rome reflects a focus upon male same-sex sexuality. Women, both before
and after, were ideologically constructed, socially and sexually, in relation to men. Cf. Joan
Kelly-Gadol, The Social Relation of the Sexes: Methodological Implications of Women's History,
in THE SIGNS READER: WOMEN, GENDER & SCHOLARSHIP (Elizabeth Abel & Emily Abel eds.,

1983) 11, 12-14 (noting that examining history through lens of gender challenges traditional
notions of periodization).
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hetero-patriarchy that it enforces are natural, normal, and moral.32
In effect, he aims to show that societies have existed in which samesex sexual activities have been accepted as normal and even culturally
desirable. By doing so, he denaturalizes, and thus helps delegitimate,
their condemnation.33
In each article, as I explore further below, the examples are
overwhelmingly of erotic attachments between men. To that extent,
the legal-political arguments of Morris, though not of Valdes, are
somewhat problematic for a project of lesbian liberation. Morris
provides strong proof of male lovemaking in traditional Hawaiian
culture and, thus, a constitutional basis for protecting such relationships. As a practical matter, many contemporary proscriptions on
"homosexuality," including the ban on same-sex marriage, have been
applied across genders. It is highly unlikely, in such cases, that a
constitutional decision protecting gay male marriage would not in fact
be extended to lesbian marriage as well, but that effect is indirect.34
It should also be noted, however, that Morris' data provides additional support for Valdes' thesis: Traditional Hawaiian culture, as he
describes it, seems to have had relatively strict and determined social
gender roles, but more fluid sexual gender roles.
Valdes' thesis, by denaturalizing heterosexuality, destroys an
argument that can be and has been used against any non-heterosexual
relationship. Indeed, by placing patriarchy and the enforcement of
gender roles at the center of his analysis, Valdes may provide a
particularly lesbian-friendly approach to understanding and fighting
heterosexism.
To what extent are the cultures described and the sources used in
describing those cultures by the authors of these articles androcentric?
What might one learn about gender and sexual orientation by
focusing on the fragmentary evidence of women's lovemaking? What
might one learn from the fact that the evidence is so fragmentary?
It is important here to recognize that this androcentrism appears to
be a characteristic of both history and the available historical

32.
33.

See, e.g., Valdes, supra note 1, at 204.
Valdes' argument, then, is analogous to William Eskridge's argument against the ban on

same-sex marriage. By demonstrating the historical existence of same-sex marriages, Eskridge
shows that "the definitional argument essentializing marriage around male-female intimacy is
factually wrong." William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV.
1419, 1422 (1993).

34. The extension is logically compelled in Baehr, since the decision rests only on the
Hawai'i Constitution's ban on sex discrimination. If, as Morris suggests, the legal claim has been
interpreted as requiring some relationship to the land, Morris, supra note 3, at 116, 120-21, the

extension of constitutional protection to aikane relationships may be limited to male-male
relationships, since all his examples that provide such a linkage to the land are male-male, see,
e.g., id. at 144-45 (discussing relationship of Lono and Kapd'ihi).
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materials.35 Within those confines, both Morris and Valdes seek to
mitigate that androcentrism.36
Morris' discussion of aikane relations is entirely about male
lovemaking. Although he begins his discussion of the term aikane by
defining it as marking "persons of any gender in a homogamous
relationship," his specific examples, from both legend and history, are
all of male-male aikane. Indeed, when he lists the elements of an
aikane relationship, two of those elements appear to assume that the
relationship is between a chief and a commoner, and thus presumably
between men.37 Again, near the end of his article, Morris asserts
that the aikane relationship operated similarly for both men and
women,38 but he does not provide the concrete information that
would give us confidence in this claim of gender equality.
Morris does suggest that his aikane material demonstrates the
existence of non-patriarchal, as well as non-heterosexist, erotic
relationships. In almost all his examples, the aikane relation is
between a chief and a person who serves him.39 The relationship
between the two, however, is often described as relatively nonhierarchical.'
Morris suggests that one characteristic of aikane
relationships is that they "blur or erase the usual lines of social
hierarchy and rank."41 The aikane relationships also serve as
evidence of the existence of marriage-like relationships not based on

35. The frequent disappearance of lesbian legal history in "homosexual" secondary sources
has been examined in Ruthann Robson, Lesbianism in Anglo-European Legal History, 5 Wis.
WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1990). Robson suggests that this problem is only partly explained by the
disproportion in the available primary sources. Researchers may be insufficiently sensitive to
material indicative of female lovemaking. Id. at 14-15.
I focus here almost entirely on the Greco-Roman era, where other English-language sources
are more readily available. My analysis of the relative place of female lovemaking in traditional
Hawaiian culture and in Native American culture is based almost solely on the materials as
presented in Morris' and Valdes' articles. It is worth noting, however, that in a 276-page book
on women in Hawaiian culture, there is essentially nothing about their sexuality vis-t-vis
Hawaiian men or other Hawaiian women, suggesting a lack of adequate, accessible primary
material. JOCiLYN LINNEKIN, SACRED QUEENS AND WOMEN OF CONSEQUENCE: RANK,
GENDER, AND COLONIALISM IN THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS (1990).

36. Both use gender-neutral language in describing the data and their implications (even, I
suggest, where such gender-neutrality may be misleading). Both seek to explore the liberatory
potential of history for sexual minorities of both genders. Valdes in particular appears to
recognize the erasure of lesbians in much legal and cultural material. See Valdes, supra note
1, at 167 (noting "the practice within legal (and social) culture of relegating gender to the realm
of 'women's issues' and sexual orientation to the realm of 'sexual minorities' issues'; the twain
are assumed hardly ever to meet").
37. See Morris, supra note 3, at 145.
38. "Kapu, mana, and the related concepts [are] seen in these aikane stories, where
sisterhood and brotherhood are spoken of synonymously with loverhood." Id. at 154.
39. The only apparent exception is the case of Namakaokai'i and Namakaopao'o, two young
chiefs who lived as a couple in greatest kapu. See id. at 151 n.224.
40. See, e.g., id. at 144-45 (discussing Lono and KapA'ihi).
41. Id. at 111.
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gendered dominance and submission.42 Morris suggests that the
missionaries' opposition to aikane relationships is logically linked with
their attempts to impose more Western concepts of marriage.4 3
Because of the paucity of examples of female aikane relationships,
one cannot tell from Morris' material if there were differences
between these relationships and those between male aikane. It would
be surprising if there were not in a culture where social gender
mattered a great deal. The paucity itself suggests a difference in the
relationships or at least in the cultural salience of the relationships.
I was also left curious about the qualities of aikane relationships. For
example, to what extent were they sexualized? The materials Morris
presents rarely include explicit reference to genital activity, though the
language is often tinged with erotic feeling.' Did the extent or form
of sexualized expression between aikane differ by gender? I do not
raise these questions as complaints. The article Morris has written is
fascinating and important. It would be ungenerous to take issue with
him for not writing a different one.45 Rather, I hope that he--or
someone else with equal theoretical sophistication and familiarity with
the Hawaiian language materials-will write as good an article from
a lesbian-centered perspective.
There is a much richer record in the Greek and Roman materials
but no more definitive answers. Valdes, like most writers about
42. The limited significance of aikane relationships for reconceptualizing heterosexual
marriage is suggested by Morris' argument that there was no gender-like hierarchy apparent in
such relationships. Id. at 138 n.153. Native American berdache marriages reinstate gendered
and unequal relationships among same-sexed persons; Hawaiian aikane relationships permit ungendered, equal relationships, but only among same-sexed persons.
43. Id. at 155-56.
44. Morris himself insists on the erotic nature of these relationships. See, e.g., id. at 145 n.
185. But the examples suggest a more complex and ambiguous situation. For example, in one
story, the character 'Umi is described as having adopted sons. Id. at 146. Morris suggests such
adoptions were a "means by which a person became the lover of another person of the same
sex." Id. Yet 'Umi also had other associates designated as aikane. Did 'Umi engage in
lovemaking with both his aikane and his adopted sons? What distinguished these relationships?
Morris insists on the necessity of context to understanding the meaning of these various relationships, but in this article provides frustratingly little specific detail.
Perhaps aikane relations were almost always homosocial but not necessarily always
homosexual. This would be consistent with the cited conclusion of Mary Kawena Puku'i that
"homosexuality was not forbidden or wrong," though so far as she knew in her youth "the
aikane relationship was 'never homosexual."' Id. 150 n.216; cf ADRIENNE RICH, Compulsory
Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in BLOOD, BREAD AND POETRY 23, 51-54 (1986)
(discussing lesbian continuum, ofwhich explicit lesbian sexuality is only endpoint).
As Morris notes, we cannot know the precise meaning of the Hawaiian language "translation"
of sodomy, moe aikane, in terms of sexual activities. Morris, supranote 3, at 129. Furthermore,
the use of the term aikane in reference to children who entered the service of chiefs might call
into question whether even homosociability is an essential aspect of an aikane relationship. Id.
at 134 n.131.
45. Indeed, Morris has written an article that comes closer to answering these questions in
earlier drafts. The later drafts and the published article, unfortunately, eliminate almost all of
the fascinating narrative fragments describing the female aikane relationships between Ua and
K,'ala and between Hi'aka and Wahine.
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Greco-Roman same-sex sexuality, concentrates on male
lovemaking. 46 As noted above, gender lines were strictly patrolled,
but male sexual gender was defined by the taking of the active role,

rather than by the sex of the partner. In this context, young boys, but
not male citizens, were socially permitted to take the passive role. If
male citizens did so, they violated their masculine gender role and
were referred to, pejoratively, as kinaidos.47

Being gendered as male, then, allowed for the possibility of sexual
attachments to another who was of the male sex, but the relationship
was expected to be hierarchical by age or by class: A masculine Greek
citizen could play the active sexual partner with a woman, a male
youth, or a male slave. On the other hand, anyone sexually gendered
as female was expected to play a passive role. And anyone born with

female genitalia was necessarily gendered female: Greek concepts of
gender and sexuality did not allow for gender fluidity among women.
One question this material raises is what role, if any, female

lovemaking played in the lives of Greek women or in the world view
embedded in Greek culture. What scholars know most clearly is how
little they know. Many Greeks wrote about male lovemaking; Greek
poetry and vase paintings often took it as a subject. There is enough

material to form the basis for entire books about Greek male
lovemaking.' The primary sources on female lovemaking are much
more fragmentary. Thus, Valdes' article, like much of the other
secondary material, focuses only incidentally on the topic. Eva
Cantarella, who began her research planning to examine the place of
women in Greece and Rome, explains in the preface to her book that
the available literature led her instead to write primarily about

men.49 In a major work on bisexuality in the ancient world, she has
only two short segments on female lovemaking in Greece and in
Rome, plus scattered other references.5 0

46. See KENNETH J. DOVER, GREEK HOMOSEXUALITY 171 (1978) (noting that his own lack
of discussion of female lovemaking "reflects the paucity of women writers and artists in the
Greek world and the virtual silence of male writers and artists on these topics").
47. See Valdes, supra note 1, at 195. The negative connotations applied even to the most
powerful men, if they played the role of kinaidos or its Roman equivalent, cineadus. Caesar
"was celebrated in antiquity for having been the lover of Nicomedes, king of Bithynia, and,
therefore, "was publicly mocked .... Catullus . . . defines him bluntly as cinaedus."
CANTERELLA, supra note 1, at 156; cf. Valdes, supra, at 199 n.134. Caesar retained respect,
nonetheless, in part because of "his fame as an adulterer." CANTARELLA, supra note 1, at 157.
Caesar, it might be concluded, played the roles simultaneously of a ladies' man and a man's lady.
48. See, e.g., BEFORE SEXUALITY, supra note 26; CANTERELLA, supranote 1; DOVER, supra
note 46.
49. CANTERELLA, supra note 1, at vii.
50. Cantarella, like Valdes, recognizes female lovemaking. In contrast, Cohen neglects it
entirely. Indeed, he apparently assumes away its very existence in his discussion of women in
arranged marriages, saying that "adultery might be the only opportunity they would ever have
for a romantic-erotic attachment." COHEN, supra note 28, at 169.
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This lack of information suggests that the topic was not of much
interest to those-almost all men-who produced the Greek and
Roman literature and art.5 ' Valdes' theory of the relationship
between sex, gender, and sexual object choice helps explain this lack
of interest. The subject of interest to men was man.52 It was
important to understand what manliness meant and how a man's
sexual activities might affect perceptions of his maleness. In Greek
ideology, a man who took the active role in sex was manly.
Pederasty was a permissible form of sexuality for the adult male
partner and acceptable for the boy so long as its physical and
emotional manifestations did not unduly effeminize him. Concern for
the youth's future manly role seems to have affected the norms for
pederasty. Some of the literature suggests that the citizen youths
were not to be penetrated and that they were not to take sexual
pleasure from the activity.53

Women were both assumed and required to be passive. Passivity
did not mean passionlessness; women were also assumed to be lustful
and to lack the male virtue of self-control. 5' Thus their chastity was
to be enforced by seclusion in the home away from other men. Such
seclusion-one is tempted to refer to it as closeting-may have made

female lovemaking more difficult, but it also made it less visible.5
Like adultery, it was an affront to patriarchy, for it suggested that the

man's control of his wife and daughters was imperfect. The idea of
female lovemaking may also have been difficult for Greek culture to
comprehend, since it posited a sexual encounter without any active

51. "Love between women, as it did not serve as an instrument to form the citizen... was
perfectly irrelevant, [and] remained something of which only women continued to speak. Thus,
sadly, we know little or nothing of how they experienced it .... Everything we know about
female homosexuality (apart from what men say about it) comes, in fact, from Sappho."
CANTERELLA, supra note 1, at 78. One of the tragedies for the possibility of an adequate
history of female lovemaking is that only a few fragments of Sappho's work survive.
52. Contra my computer's grammar check, this does not mean "human being."
53.

CHRISTINE DOWNING, MYTHS AND MYSTERIES OF SAME-SEX LOVE 141 (1989) (the

youth "expects no physical gratification."); DAVID M. HALPERIN, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF
HOMOSEXUALITY 55 (1990). See generally Valdes, supra note 1, at 190-91. In ancient Greece,
as in contemporary America, practices, no doubt, could not wholly be predicted from ideals.
Indeed, the existence of a norm often suggests a desire or practice in need of disciplining.
54. See Valdes, supra note 1, at 179. "Women are assumed to be markedly more open to
erotic emotion than men and sexually insatiable once aroused." Anne Carson, Putting Her in
Her Place: Women, Dirt and Desire,in BEFORE SEXUALITY, supra note 26, at 135, 138. See also
COHEN, supra note 28, at 138 ("[I]n her passionate and emotional nature and the violence of
her sexual instincts, which she is felt as little able to control, [woman] is regarded as irrational,
unstable, dangerous.").
55. As Winkler says, "simply knowing the protocols [i.e. the fundamental conventions] does
not tell us how people behaved." John J. Winkler, Laying Down the Law, in BEFORE
SEXUALITY, supra note 26, at 171, 176. See supra note 28.
As Cohen points out, the seclusion was never completely successful, else there would be no
opportunity for adultery and hence no need to punish it. COHEN, supra note 28, at 135.
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partner.56 Such practices would also have been insignificant to the
underlying social structure. Women were important to the Greek
polity insofar as they were available for men sexually and
procreationally. This availability, in Greco-Roman society, would not
have been incompatible with female lovemaking. Women might
spend some time in their lives in all-female company; then, or at other
times, they might be involved with other women with whom they
came in contact. Those same women would also be linked with men
for economic survival.57 Women citizens would be wives and
mothers; other women might be prostitutes.
The few fragmentary references to female lovemaking by male
Greek and Roman writers are consistent with this perspective. Unlike
pederasty, lovemaking between women was viewed negatively. Plato
describes women attracted to other women as "savage, uncontrollable,
dangerous females."5 8 The woman seen as the initiator of the
encounter was constructed as having assumed a male gender. 59 "In
the Roman imagination, female lovemaking could only mean an
attempt by a woman to replace a man. '
The notion of female lovemaking as a violation of female gender
norms is perhaps most vividly illustrated in Ovid's story of Iphis and
Ianthe. Iphis is born a girl, but her mother, at the advice of the gods,
placates her husband by telling him that she has borne a son. Iphis
is thus raised as a boy. When she reaches adulthood, her father
betroths her to Ianthe, with whom she is in love. The myth assumes

56. Valdes describes the gender transitivity of the Greek male citizen over his lifespan as
involving the treatment of youth-like female objects "while preserving their capacity to act as
'male' subjects socially and sexually later in life." Valdes, supranote 1, at 190 (emphasis added).
Female lovemaking would, on that conception, entail sexuality without subjectivity. Cf. Sylvia
Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIs. L. REV. 189, 202 ("Lesbians
were censured by silence; sexual acts between two women were unimaginable.").
The dominant culture, both in ancient Greece and today, associated activity with sexual
pleasure; the (active) (male) partner is the one whose sexual pleasure was central. Oddly, it is
only within lesbian culture that one encounters the radical separation of activity and pleasure
in the figure of the stone butch, who actively seeks the pleasuring of her partner but ideally is
never the object of sexual pleasuring by that partner.
57. Female "marriages" could not readily have occurred in the ancient world "because
women had fewer economic opportunities, and less social and legal freedom than men."
Eskridge, supra note 33, at 1419, 1447.
58. CANTERELLA, supra note 1, at 92; see also id. at 166 (noting that Romans viewed women
loving women as "worst form of female depravity"). Thus, I think Valdes slips into
androcentrism when he says, "Greek sex/gender arrangements remained aggressively
androsexist, though not especially heterosexist." Valdes, supra note 1, at 162. At a different
point, Valdes acknowledges the "meta-androcentrism" of such an assertion, when he notes that
Greek women were "subjected" to "compulsory heterosexuality for life." Id. at 196.
59. Women who took the active role vis-A-vis other women were seen as "los[ing] the natural
characteristics of their sex, becoming a sort of caricature of maleness." CANTERELLA, supra
note 1, at 93. In Martial's satire, the woman Bassa is condemned as follows: "You dare to bring
together a couple of quims, and your portentous lust imitates a man." Id. at 167.
60. Id. at 170.
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that this love of one woman for another would be seen as unnatural
and shameful.6" The gods solve the dilemma by turning Iphis into
a boy. Thus the split between gender and sex is solved by a
miraculous precursor to transsexualism.6 2
The most extensive information about female lovemaking in ancient
Greece, of course, comes from the poetry of Sappho. Unfortunately,
what survives are only a few fragments of the poems and references
to Sappho and her poetry in the works of other ancient writers.63
The evidence is insufficient to draw any definitive conclusions, but it
appears that female lovemaking as practiced by Sappho and others
was different than the male lovemaking epitomized by pederasty.
Relations among women likely occurred within all-female social
groupings, such as thiasoi and groups of maenads. The thiasoi were
societies of young maidens, led by teachers such as Sappho. While in
the thiasoi, the girls "loved other women ... with a passionate love,
experienced with exceptional sensibility and ecstasy. ' The samesex eroticism, with the teachers or among themselves, might have
been a kind of rite of passage for the young girls, but it would have
been a life-long practice for the teachers. 6 Maenads were legendary
groups of married women temporarily away from their husbands in a
religious ritual centered around Dionysus. "They seem to have
represented an initiation of women by women into women's own
One can infer erotic
sexuality, into arousal for its own sake."'
linkages within these groups, and at least some of the linkages appear
to be between equals. 67 Cantarella suggests that the homosexual
bond within the thiasoi "appears less like an educational relationship
and more like the free expression of reciprocal feeling, giving rise to

61. Iphis is quoted as saying, "Cows do not love cows, nor mares, mares; but the ram desires
the sheep, and his own doe follows the stag.... In the whole animal world there is no female
smitten with love for female.... The daughter of the Sun loved a bull ... my passion is more
mad than that." 2 OVID, METAMORPHOSES 55-57 (Frank J.Miller trans., Harvard University
Press 1916).
62. The transformation of sex rather than gender when the two are misaligned would have
been seen as less extraordinary in premodem times. Contemporary understanding is that
biological sex is fixed, and gender the cultural epiphenomenon. By contrast, in earlier periods,
"sex, or the body, must be understood as the epiphenomenon, while gender, what we would take
to be a cultural category, was primary or 'real."' THOMAS LAQUEUR, MAKING SEX: BODY AND
GENDER FROM THE GREEKS TO FREUD 8 (1990).
SEVEN
Sappho include GuY DAVENPORT,
books on
63. Contemporary
GREEKS/TRANSLATIONS (1995); JEFFREY M. DUBON, ANCIENT AND MODERN IMAGES OF
SAPPHO: TRANSLATIONS AND STUDIES IN ARCHAIC GREEK LOVE LYRICS (1983); FROM
SAPPHO TO DE SADE: MOMENT IN THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (Jan Bremmer ed., 1989).
64. CANTERELLA, supra note 1, at 79.
65. See, e.g., ARTHUR EVANS, THE GOD OF EcSTACY 72-74 (1988).
66. DOWNING, supra note 53, at 194. Nymphs were unmarried females who similarly took
part temporarily in an all-female world. Id. at 197.
67. By contrast, as Valdes notes, while male "social equals sometimes bonded as mates,"
"these socially symmetrical bondings were deemed problematic." Valdes, supra note 1, at 193.
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relationship between two people who have chosen each
an equal
68
other.
Thus, the histories of male and of female lovemaking in ancient
Greece and Rome appear to be quite different. The nature and
frequency of the practices may have been different. The social
significance of the practices were surely different. And the responses
to the practices in the surviving literature are quite different.
In Hawaiian and Native American cultures, the gender differences
appear less powerful. There seems to be less androcentrism in the
literature, i.e., the narratives and discussions are less overwhelmingly
male-centered. It may also be true that the gender of the same-sex
couple is less significant within these cultures. This would be
consistent with Morris' suggestion that heterosexual couplings in
traditional Hawaiian culture were less gendered than in EuroAmerican culture.69
How might the meaning and potential uses of history change if one
were to focus on the gendered differences in the histories of same-sex
sexualities? First, the history explicit and implicit in the Morris and
Valdes articles provides additional evidence for the proposition that
the concept of "homosexuality" is itself historically contingent. There
is no necessary connection between male-male lovemaking and
female-female lovemaking.
I suggest that two facts about Euro-American culture make the
conflation of these practices into the single term "homosexuality"
seem natural. First, heterosexuality is both assumed as the natural
and normal form of sexual practice, and assumed away as a subject to
be examined. Second, patriarchy, which makes heterosexuality a
joining of two unequal genders, is similarly both pervasive and
invisible. Only when heterosexuality is centered, and the patriarchy
that it underpins is obscured, do same-sex relations between women
and same-sex relations between men appear fundamentally the same,
because each becomes defined simply as "not heterosexual."
The use of gender-neutral language, like "homosexuality," in
describing practices of both this and other cultures is politically
understandable. Indeed, I believe that theorizing and acting on the
basis of a concept of homosexuality is a politically desirable choice in
68. CANTERELLA, supra note 1, at 83. See also David M. Halperin, Why is Diotima a
Woman, in BEFORE SEXUALITY, supra note 26, at 257, 274. Halperin suggests that mutuality
and equality may have been seen by the Greeks as a characteristic inherent in female sexuality.
"[E]rotic reciprocity was relegated to the province of women, who were thought capable of both
giving and receiving pleasure in the sexual act at the same time and in relation to the same
individual." Id. at 270.
69. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 3, at 154-55. I suggest this quite tentatively, given the
limited nature of the materials provided by Morris and Valdes and my ignorance of any
extensive additional materials.
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many contexts. Such conflation, however, may obscure the particularly gendered nature of both sexual practices and responses to
those practices.7"

The meaning and sources of lesbianism and gay maleness may be
similar or different in complex ways. Though both involve same-sex
activities, one is between people raised as men and the other between
people raised as women; that will make them distinctive phenomena
in any deeply gendered society.71 There are tantalizing hints of such
differences in the Greco-Roman material. These were cultures in
which gender was a fundamental organizing principle and people born
female were always gendered as feminine. They were thus expected
to live in subordinate relationships with men.72 This same principle
of dominance operated in relationships between "masculine"/active
males and "feminine"/passive males. Lovemaking between women,
however, may not have embodied the same hierarchical relationship.73 Reactions to it also differed. While male lovemaking was a
subject of careful consideration and approval, subject to particular74
rules of conduct, lovemaking between women was either ignored
or derided as a failed attempt at "being male."75 One might find

70. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 1074 n.9 (noting that "women had different social and
biological roles and responsibilities," and thus history of attitudes toward and treatment of male
lovemaking would be different than one regarding female lovemaking).
Both Valdes and Morris use gender neutral language in the context of discussions in which
essentially all the provided examples are male. I do not single them out, both because these
authors are not unique in this regard and because I recognize the double-bind of appearing
either to ignore lovemaking between women or to conflate it with lovemaking between men
when one is discussing materials that are overwhelmingly about the latter. Nonetheless, we must
constantly be aware of this linguistic and epistemological dilemma.
71. Blackwood, in calling for a breaking of the conflation of the two in anthropological
studies, criticizes the "assumption that lesbian behavior is the mirror-image of male
homosexuality.... [T]he act of having sex with a member of one's own sex may be culturally
defined in rather divergent ways for men and women." Evelyn Blackwood, Breaking the Mirror,
in

THE

MANY

FACES

OF

HOMOSEXUALITY:

ANTHROPOLOGICAL

APPROACHES

TO

HOMOSEXUAL RELATIONS 1, 6 (Evelyn Blackwood ed., 1986).
Consider the complex reactions within the lesbian community to male-to-female transsexuals
who seek acceptance as lesbians. The resistance reflects in part a belief that such persons
inevitably take on certain masculine characteristics which differentiate them from women-born
women. See KATE BORNSTEIN, GENDER OUTLAW: ON MEN, WOMEN, AND THE REST OF US
41-42 (1995). The range of contemporary attitudes and practices among lesbians and their
relationship to the social gender of the women who engage in such practices is beyond the scope
of this Comment.
72. Cf. Valdes, supra note 1, at 174 ("The construction and operation of 'femininity'
therefore increasingly denoted, and required, socio-sexual deference and surrender to
'masculinity."').
73. Greco-Roman female lovemaking would also have been distinctively different than either
Greco-Roman male lovemaking or contemporary lesbianism, because of women's exclusion from
public life.
74. Our knowledge of female lovemaking in Greece is largely of practices from earliest
Greek myth and legend. "The old lesbian circles were completely gone and so repressed were
women in classical Athens that we have almost no information on lesbianism from this period."
EVANS, supra note 65, at 108.
75.

CANTERELLA, supra note 1, at 93.
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echoes of contemporary differences in lesbian and gay male practices
and in social-legal responses to lesbians and gay men. The extent to
which these differences reflect gender differences common to all
patriarchal cultures is a subject for further examination.
Whatever the commonalities between gay men and lesbians today
in the subjective experience of same-sex sexuality, they clearly share
experiences of being subjected to homophobia. To the extent, then,
that homophobia can be historicized and denaturalized, this effort is
of direct benefit to lesbians. The relevance to us of the7 6history of
male-male erotic attachments per se is more problematic.
Even homophobia, however, is not a gender-neutral phenomenon.
It is true that contemporary law and social attitudes yoke together gay
men and lesbians and condemn, often in similarly hostile language,
those sexual practices in which members of each group engage (while
generally ignoring the frequency of such practices among
heterosexuals)."
The different responses to lesbians and gay men by the dominant
culture, I think, can be linked in part to the different ways in which
lesbians and gay men are traitors to their gender roles. Patriarchy is
one thread that links together Greece and contemporary EuroAmerican society.78 In patriarchal cultures, male homosexuality will
draw hostility because it suggests the refusal of the dominant role the
society offers and thus threatens the naturalness and legitimacy of
male superiority.79 As others have pointed out, a man who rejects
the mantle of maleness is seen as a queer, a fag, a threat to the

76. Such histories are a necessary part of examining the question of historic differences and
commonalities. It is important for lesbians simultaneously to develop and discover as much and
as rich a history of female lovemaking as the sources will allow. For examples of contributions
to that project, see, e.g., LILLIAN FADERMAN, ODD GIRLS AND TWILIGHT LOVERS: A HISTORY

OF LESBIAN LIFE IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICAN (1991); ELIZABETH LAPOVSKY
KENNEDY & MADELINE D. DAVIS, BOOTS OF LEATHER, SLIPPERS OF GOLD: THE HISTORY OF
A LESBIAN COMMUNITY (1993); CARROLL SMITH-ROSENBERG, DISORDERLY CONDUCT:

VISIONS OF GENDER IN VICTORIA AMERICA 244-96 (1985); Judith C. Brown, Lesbian Sexuality
in Medieval and Early Modern Europe, in HIDDEN FROM HISTORY: RECLAIMING THE GAY &

LESBIAN PAST 67 (Martin Bauml Duberman et al. eds., 1990).
77. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (reconstructing challenge to sodomy statute as
question of constitutionality of ban on "homosexual sodomy"). Pat Buchanan's condemnation
of gays and lesbians as part of his "cultural war" for "family values" furnishes an additional
example. Philip Gailey, Bush Embraces a Divisive Strategy, PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 21, 1992,
at 15A; Tom Teepen, GOP Takes Aim at "Other" America, THE ATLANTA CONST., Aug. 21,
1992, at All.
78. Valdes argues that patriarchy is absent from Native American societies. Though Morris
does not discuss patriarchy, his discussion of traditional Hawaiian culture suggests a world
perhaps more like Native American cultures, in which the genders have different roles, but they
are not connected by subordination and domination of women by men.
79. Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex
Discrimination,69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 235-36 (1994); cf. JOHN STOLTENBERG, REFUSING TO
BE A MAN 50-52 (1989)(describing mutually reinforcing relationships between male supremacy
and sexual objectification).
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Men's rejection of their gender roles is innatural order.80
comprehensible and therefore condemned.
Although such responses are common, they are, of course, conceptually unstable.
Contemporary dominant culture defines
homosexuality by the sex of the partner, so that a man who is the
active partner of another man is a homosexual. Yet is he a genderdefying "sissy"? The paradoxes of seeing homosexual acts performed
by "non-homosexual" actors reflects the intertwined but incoherent
conceptions of active-passive, sexual orientation (defined by sex of
partner), and maleness. 81 The conflation does not fully reflect
reality, 2 but the belief that gay men are not real men helps fuel the
basis for the straight world's fear and hatred.
The reaction to lesbianism is somewhat different. 3 Rejecting the
female social gender is, while inappropriate, understandable.
Everyone knows why girls would be tomboys, though most people
expect them to grow up to be real women.' The dominant culture
expects women in the world of work to exhibit certain masculine
characteristics, such as assertiveness, which seem necessary to success,
while simultaneously expecting them to be feminine. Women are thus
expected both to be women and to succeed on terms that require
them to be "men." 5 In terms of sexual gender as well, homophobia

80. See generally Case, supra note 23, at 62-63; Marc Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche
Together,.46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511,621-23 (1992); Valdes, supra note 18. Interestingly, Morris
highlights a concern with manliness among the Christian missionaries to Hawai'i as one of the
roots of their disapproval of aspects of Hawaiian culture, including its insufficient patriarchy and,
inferentially, its recognition of same-sex sexualities. Morris, supra note 3, at 125.
81. In prison, for example, the man who "takes" another man sexually is still constructed
by himself and others as heterosexual. See RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON 121-22 (1992)
(discussing this and other examples of what he calls "opportunistic homosexuality").
This paradox is perhaps most vivid in the Department of Defense policies regarding
homosexuals in the military. The policy purports to be based upon actions. However, a man
who has had sex with another man may nonetheless be retained in the military by showing that
the act was out of character, that he was a heterosexual who happened to have sex with a
homosexual man. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuitof Manhood and the Desegregationof the
Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV. 499, 549 (1991).
82. "It seems to make little difference whether a man takes the active or the passive role
• . . any sexual desire by one male for another leads to categorization as an effeminate
sodomite." Randolph Trumbach, Genderand the Homosexual Role in Modern Western Culture:
The 18th and 19th CenturiesCompared, in HOMOSEXUALITY, WHICH HOMOSEXUALITY 149,153
(Dennis Altman et al. eds., 1989).
83. For a thorough discussion of the ways in which the conflation of gender and sexual
orientation is itself gendered, see Case, supranote 23. That is, we respond differently to sissies
than to dykes. Case suggests that, at least in the public world, the most severe consequences
are imposed on those, female or male, who are excessively feminine and that this both reflects
and exacerbates patriarchal norms.
84. "One is not born, but rather becomes a woman." SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND
SEX 301 (Vintage Books 1974).
85. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) ("An employer who objects to
aggressiveness in women but whose positions require this trait places women in an intolerable
and impermissible catch-22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do
not."); see also Case, supra note 23, at 26; Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and
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as constructed through patriarchy is gendered. Lesbians are condemned both for what we do not do as well as for what we
do-engage in "unnatural" sexual practices. Lesbians are seen as
women who hate men and who refuse to make themselves sexually
available to men. 6 One canard is that lesbians are simply women
who have never had good heterosexual sex. 7 Not surprisingly,
heterosexual male pornography is full of images of "lesbianism," in
which the women perform for men, as a foreplay to performing under
men. 8 This vision of lesbianism is used to police all women.
Feminism is dismissed as a lesbian-led attack on the American
(heterosexual) way of life. 9 Women's availability to men in the
military is enforced by the threat that saying no to one man's sexual
advances is equivalent
to saying no to all, and thus announcing
9
oneself as a lesbian. 0
The history suggests that lesbian and gay men are linked at least as
much by their oppression as by their practices. Each is condemned
for the perceived denial of true gender, but the genders to which they
are disloyal are different. The demand for gender loyalty is, in turn,
an essential precondition to the enforcement of patriarchy. Thus, the
oppression of gay men and lesbians is linked to the oppression of
women as women, whether heterosexual or lesbian. This linkage
between heterosexism and patriarchy sometimes tends to disappear
in discussions of gayness. One aspect of that disappearance is
linguistic: Lesbians are women, but "women" often means
heterosexual women; lesbians are homosexual, but "homosexual"
often means homosexual men. 91 I recognize that there is no simple
Work. JudicialInterpretationsof Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raisingthe
Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1750, 1832-37 (1990); Williams, supra note 19,

at 842.
86. "Lesbianism... is a form of insubordination: it denies that female sexuality exists, or
should exist, only for the sake of male gratification." Koppelman, supra note 79, at 236.
Adrienne Rich accepts and inverts this link between lesbianism and independence from men.

See RICH, supra note 44.
87. Thus, George Socarides includes as the first group in his taxonomy of homosexual
women those women who "retain their interest in men" but "are intent upon being accepted by
men as one of them... [and] complain of... their unjust and ill treatment by men." They are
defined as less normal than women who play the passive role in lesbian sex-"the penis is
replaced by a tongue or finger" of a woman. HOMOSEXUALITY 139-40 (1978). Koppelman

makes this point slightly more crudely. Koppelman, supra note 79, at 248.
88.

But cf.Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, 769 F. 2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985). In Douglass, Judge

Posner, considering a claim of false light privacy by a model who said she had been depicted as
a lesbian, stated, "Few men are interested in lesbians. The purpose of showing two women in
apparent sexual embraces is to display the charms of two women." Id. at 1135.
89. Koppelman, supra note 79, at 236. See generally, RICH, supra note 44.
90. See Michelle M. Benecke & Kirstin S. Dodge, Lesbian Baiting as Sexual Harassment
Women in the Military, in HOMOPHOBIA: How WE ALL PAY THE PRICE 167, 167-76 (Warren
J. Blumenfeld ed., 1992).

91. See Cheshire Calhoun, The Gender Closet: Lesbian Disappearance under the Sign
"Women," 21 FEMINIST STUDIES 7 (1995). This problem of the disappearance of those at the
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solution to this problem. The obscuring is built into our language, in
which every word seems to carry with it the unmarked category in all
other dimensions: "Women" are both white and heterosexual unless
I say otherwise; "gays" are white men.
It may be useful to be more explicit in recognizing that the politics
around issues of sexualities is inherently coalition politics.9" Lesbians
and gay men have issues in common around which we can work, but
we are not the same, and our issues are not always the same."
Issues, leadership questions, and strategies must always be specific,
tentative and provisional.
Understanding the relationship between heterosexism and patriarchy and the conflation of sex, gender, and sexual orientation, and
understanding the effect of these ideologies on lesbians, on gay men,
and on all women is necessary, but not sufficient, for deconstructing
them. These are ideologies, not objective truths, but that does not
mean that they will simply evaporate on being exposed to light. What
the work of Valdes, Morris, and others does is to create a space for
politics. They demonstrate that civilizations have flourished without
compulsory heterosexuality and without compulsory gender roles for
men and, though less often, for women.
In the political space opened up by these ongoing historical,
sociological, and anthropological efforts, we may want to build our
coalition politics around "queerness." The concept of queerness is
useful to a coalition politics, insofar as it purports to focus on
differences from the dominant group without privileging any
particular other category.94 If queerness is to serve such a role,
however, it must shed its image (reality?) as a movement of young,
predominantly male, sex radicals.95

intersection of oppression has been most thoroughly analyzed in the context of women of color.
"Women and people of color" leaves women of color everywhere and thus nowhere; a similar
problem arises with the phrases "women and gays" or "women and sexual minorities."
92. For a beginning of a conversation about the relationships between gay men and lesbians
and the possibilities of connection, see SISTER AND BROTHER: LESBIANS AND GAY MEN WRITE
ABOUT THEIR LtvEs TOGETHER (Joan Nestle & John Preston eds., 1994).

93. Thus, one might hope that the intense effort many lesbians have engaged in as part of
the struggle against AIDS will induce a reciprocal commitment by gay men to the struggles

around women's health issues.
94. Evelynn Hammonds, Black (W)holes and the Geometry of Black Female Sexuality, 6
DIFFERENCE 126, 129 (1994).

95. As Mary Becker says, "[T]here is no feminist politics in queer theory and practice, nor
any politics of race and class. What is key is a notion of sexual (or gender) outlawry." Mary
Becker, Sexuality and What (Many) Women Want 37 (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (footnotes omitted). See also JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER 228 (1993);
Suzanne Moore, Looking for Trouble: Queering the Pitch for Lesbians, THE GUARDIAN, June
11, 1992, at 19 ("Many lesbians feel they have once more been made invisible by the queer
movement which has simply reproduced an agenda that is primarily white and male."). Others
argue that the notion of queerness can and should transcend the androcentrism of the term
"gay." See Melanie Phillips, Politics of the New Queer, THE GUARDIAN, June 23, 1992, at 19.
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It may also be useful to center our queer politics around lesbians.
Valdes argues, persuasively I believe, that patriarchy is the deeper
root around which heterosexism has entwined itself. The disentangling of this tangle of oppressions might best begin from the
position of those most crushed by hetero-patriarchy. Consider, for
instance, if our understanding of the opposition to gay marriage or to
gays in the military might be different if it focused first upon lesbians
who were denying sexual access to heterosexual men, rather than
upon gay men who were "flaunting" the possibility of an alternative
sexuality for men. Imagine if we focused our reconceptualization of
family on lesbian couples who were building their families with the
assistance of sperm banks. Would this help us to unravel JudeoChristianity's conflation of heterosexuality, procreation, and family?
There are many questions and challenges. Questions and challenges,
however, are a sign of progress. No longer, if ever, is the story of
lesbianism to be one of lies, secrets, and silence.97

96. As Judith Butler suggests, we should rethink the relationship between concepts of gender
and sexuality "in order to muddle the lines between queer theory and feminism." BUTLER, supra
note 95, at 239.
97. Cf. ADRIENNE RICH, LIES, SECRETS AND SILENCE: SELECTED PROSE 1966-1978 (1979).

